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Introduction: Legal Pluralism in a 
Globalized World 
Janine Ubink* 
This issue of the UC Irvine Law Review results from a symposium on legal 
pluralism, co-organized by the Commission on Legal Pluralism and the University 
of California, Irvine School of Law in August 2016. The Commission on Legal 
Pluralism was established in 1978 by the International Union of Anthropological 
and Ethnological Sciences (IUAES) and is affiliated with the International 
Association of Legal Science (IALS). The Commission aims to further knowledge 
and understanding of legal pluralism, with a focus upon theoretical and practical 
problems resulting from the interaction of different types of law, such as state law, 
international and transnational law, religious law, and customary law. Among its 
main activities are the organization of international symposia; the initiation and 
encouragement of Regional Working Groups in different parts of the world; and 
the organization and delivery of courses and summer schools on legal pluralism.1 
Legal pluralism is generally defined as the presence of more than one legal 
order in a social field.2 It was a response to legal centralist ideology that law is and 
should be the law of the state and that other normative orderings are hierarchically 
subordinate to state law.3 The concept also reacted to the trend in classical legal 
anthropology until the 1950s or ’60s to “edit out the state” in their studies that 
usually focused on small, isolated, untouched societies.4 Researchers approached 
the customary legal systems of these societies as autonomous legal systems, largely 
disregarding the colonial government and its actors; they were thus unconcerned 
with any interaction between state and local normative systems and the resulting 
 
* Janine Ubink is a professor of Law, Governance and Development at Leiden University and the 
President of the Commission on Legal Pluralism. 
1. See Citizenship, Legal Pluralism and Governance in the Age of Globalization, COMMISSION ON 
LEGAL PLURALISM, http://commission-on-legal-pluralism.com/nl/home [https://perma.cc/6JLK-
6GVL] ( last visited Mar. 21, 2018). 
2. John Griffiths, What is Legal Pluralism?, 24 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & UNOFFICIAL L. 1, 1 
(1986). 
3. Franz von Benda-Beckmann, Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?, 47 J. LEGAL PLURALISM & 
UNOFFICIAL L. 37, 37 (2002). 
4. Keebet von Benda-Beckmann, Noot 24: Rechtspluralisme, in DE SOCIALE WERKING VAN 
RECHT: EEN KENNISMAKING MET DE RECHTSSOCIOLOGIE EN RECHTSANTROPOLOGIE 740  
( J. Griffiths ed., 1996). 
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complex normative structures.5 When legal anthropologists became more interested 
in the role of the state, their focus on disputes and disputing6 led them to 
overestimate the role of the state. They regarded customary law as an invention by 
the state, ignoring the fact that much law formation and application takes place 
outside of disputing and that customary law outside of the courts was much less 
influenced by the state.7 Today there is a much stronger realization of the different 
versions of customary law, including official versions such as judicial customary law 
and in some countries codified customary law, and the gap between these versions 
and the local lived or living customary law.8 
In the decades following the introduction of the concept of legal pluralism, 
étatists9 continued to reject it on the premise that only normative orders emanating 
from the state could be considered law.10 Legal pluralists countered that for many 
people, in many places, state law is not the dominant normative order, and that 
people choose when to use which normative system and related fora.11 As such, 
legal centralism is a construction or, as Griffiths says, “a myth, an ideal, a claim, an 
illusion,”12 while legal pluralism is the empirical reality. They also argued that 
normative orders differ in degrees of institutionalization, specialization and 
sanctioning mechanisms, and that customary justice systems did not differ so 
fundamentally from other forms of normative ordering that any comparison 
between state and non-state normative ordering would be prima facie faulty.13 They 
thus argued that legal pluralism should be understood as a comparative-analytical 
concept and not as a juristic one. 
The term legal pluralism was coined to put the issue of competing legal orders 
center stage. Originally, studies of legal pluralism focused on the relationship 
between state law and customary law in former colonies.14 Over time, there was a 
realization that legal pluralism is a characteristic of virtually every society. Studies of 
 
5. Id. 
6. MAX GLUCKMAN, THE JUDICIAL PROCESS AMONG THE BAROTSE OF NORTHERN 
RHODESIA (1955); LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY (Laura Nader ed., 1969); LEOPOLD POSPISIL, 
KAPAUKU PAPUANS AND THEIR LAW (Human Relations Area Files Press 1964) (1958); Martin 
Chanock, Neither Customary nor Legal: African Customary Law in an Era of Family Law Reform, 3 
INT’L. J.L. & FAM. 72 (1989); P.H. Gulliver, Social Control in an African Society: A Study of the Arusha: 
Agricultural Masai of Northern Tanganyika, in INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF SOCIOLOGY AND SOCIAL 
RECONSTRUCTION (W.J.H. Sprott ed., 1963). 
7. Keebet von Benda-Beckmann & Bertram Turner, Anthropological Roots of (Global) Legal 
Pluralism 2–3 ( June 21, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
8. See OLAF ZENKER & MARKUS VIRGIL HOEHNE, THE STATE AND THE PARADOX OF 
CUSTOMARY LAW IN AFRICA (2018) (finding the difficulty this gap creates for state bureaucrats in 
various African countries). 
9. Étatism is defined as control of the state over individual citizens. Étatists thus adhere to the 
legal centralist ideology that law is and should be the law of the state. 
10. See von Benda-Beckmann, supra note 4, at 743. 
11. Id. at 744. 
12. Griffiths, supra note 2, at 4. 
13. See Brian Z. Tamanaha, The Folly of the ‘Social Scientific’ Concept of Legal Pluralism, 20 J.L. & 
SOC’Y 192 (1993); von Benda-Beckmann, supra note 4, at 743–44. 
14. See Sally E. Merry, Legal Pluralism, 22 L. & SOC’Y REV. 869 (1988). 
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legal pluralism now include such diverse fields as the New York garment industry,15 
farmers and cattle ranchers,16 religious courts,17 sumo wrestlers,18 stand-up 
comedians,19 and slum dwellers.20 Legal pluralism studies reject dualistic distinctions 
between state law and non-state forms of ordering in favor of dialectic analysis of 
their interrelations.21 It is individual behavior and processes of interaction, struggle, 
and negotiation within and between various social fields that determine what the 
law effectively is at a particular time and location.22 Terms such as semi-autonomous 
social fields,23 interlegality,24 vernacularization,25 and hybridity26 have been 
introduced to describe these interrelations. 
General acceptance of the concept among lawyers and social scientists only 
happened at the end of the twentieth century, when the expansion of globalization 
and the proliferation of international and transnational law started to take on 
dimensions that clearly refuted the argument that nation-states are the only 
legitimate source of lawmaking.27 As a corollary, opposition against the notion of 
legal pluralism within national legal systems and at sub-national levels also 
dissolved.28 
The symposium on “Legal Pluralism” brought together ten researchers based 
in North America who are working on legal pluralism from various disciplines, 
including law, anthropology, history, and political science. Five of the symposium’s 
articles appear in this issue. In the first, Pran Justice: Social Order, Dispute Processing, 
 
15. See generally Griffiths, supra note 2; Sally Falk Moore, Law and Social Change: The Semi-
Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study, 7 L. & SOC’Y REV. 719 (1973). 
16. See generally ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES (1991); David M. Engel, Legal Pluralism in an American Community: Perspectives on a Civil 
Trial Court, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 425. 
17. See generally Daphne Hacker, Religious Tribunals in Democratic States: Lessons from the Israeli 
Rabbinical Courts, 27 J. L. & RELIGION 59 (2011). 
18. See generally Mark D. West, Legal Rules and Social Norms in Japan’s Secret World of Sumo, 26 
J. LEGAL STUD. 165 (1997). 
19. See generally Dotan Oliar & Chistopher Sprigman, There’s No Free Laugh (Anymore): The 
Emergence of Intellectual Property Norms and the Transformation of Stand-Up Comedy, 94 VA. L. REV. 1787 
(2008). 
20. See generally Manuel A. Gómez, The Tower of David: Social Order in a Vertical Community, 
10 FIU L. REV. 215 (2014). 
21. See Merry, supra note 13, at 880. 
22. Griffiths, supra note 2, at 36. 
23. See generally Moore, supra note 14. 
24. See generally BOAVENTURA DE SOUSA SANTOS, TOWARD A NEW LEGAL COMMON SENSE: 
LAW, GLOBALIZATION, AND EMANCIPATION 437 (2d ed. 2002); Andre Hoekema, Rechtspluralisme 
en Interlegaliteit ( Jan. 2004) ( lecture presented at Inaugural Lecture of University of Amsterdam) (on 
file with author). 
25. See generally SALLY ENGLE MERRY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND GENDER VIOLENCE: 
TRANSLATING INTERNATIONAL LAW INTO LOCAL JUSTICE (2006). 
26. See generally HYBRIDITY: LAW, CULTURE AND DEVELOPMENT (Nicolas Lemay-Hébert & 
Rosa Freedman eds., 2017). 
27. von Benda-Beckmann & Turner, supra note 7, at 4. 
28. See Peggy Levitt & Sally Merry, Vernacularization on the Ground: Local Uses of Global 
Women’s Rights in Peru, China, India and the United States, 9 GLOBAL NETWORKS 441 (2009); von 
Benda-Beckmann & Turner, supra note 7. See also the other contributions in this special issue. 
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and Adjudication in the Venezuelan Prison Subculture, Manuel Gómez describes the 
internal ordering of social life by inmates inside a Venezuelan prison. The prisons 
of Venezuela are in a deep crisis. The perception is that the government has lost its 
grip on them and that this has turned them into highly dangerous places for inmates. 
The almost total absence of government oversight and the institutional disarray has 
enabled certain groups of inmates to expand the reach of their criminal networks to 
prison, and to establish powerful internal social and political hierarchies that rely on 
the pervasive use of violence as a mechanism of social control. Self-created norms, 
called the Code of the Inmate, govern all aspects of individual behavior and group 
interactions. These norms not only regulate the substance, but also the procedural 
vehicles to make rights and duties effective. While the prison culture emerges and 
operates in an environment that glorifies violence, discrimination, and other values 
that run against the official legal system, Gómez highlights that the inmates are 
interested in regulating their social dynamics, not because they want to resist or 
challenge the official legal system, but because they need to regulate their life behind 
bars and create certainty. The inmates’ informal justice system mimics a highly 
bureaucratic order where concerns for due process, legitimacy, and community 
order are paramount. In fact, the inmates seem to have a higher regard for the due 
process safeguards in their own system than the ones offered by the formal legal 
system. While there is an absolute divorce between the official law and the Code of 
the Inmate, this shows that not all aspects of the Venezuelan prison sub-culture are 
negative, as the internal ordering by inmates regulates and safeguards the provision 
of goods and services as well as the maintenance of social order in prison. 
Counterintuitively, and contrary to generalized belief, criminal groups may thus 
reduce anarchy and create certainty among their members. Their main value is, 
however, to their members, not to society at large. 
The second article, FARC Justice: Rebel Rule of Law, by René Provost, brings 
us to the neighboring country of Colombia. In this country, rebel group 
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) was a dominant presence in 
more than half of the country over long periods of time. In these areas, FARC has 
been involved in the provision of public goods, such as security, and the 
management of social issues, such as labor relations, commerce, family life, and 
taxation. One facet of this “rebel governance” has been the administration of 
justice. From a centralist perspective—seeing the state as the only authority to create 
legal standards—norms adopted by non-state armed groups cannot be labeled 
“law” and their dispute settlement institutions not “courts.” While it is 
understandable that governments object to characterizations of rebel norms and 
dispute settlers in terms of law and courts—afraid that this may endow legitimacy 
on the rebel group—empirically, it is inadequate to regard state law as the sole or 
even as the dominant normative order in FARC dominated areas. Provost then 
turns to legal pluralism and its critique on centralism and extends this to the 
exclusive association of the concept of the rule of law with the state. He explores 
the malleability of the concept, with descriptions ranging from “thin” to “thick” 
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versions, and shows that the exclusive association of law and the state is recent and 
unjustified, “rooted neither in the concept of law nor in the idea of the state.”29 
Following legal pluralism’s stance that law is not, and never has been, a state 
monopoly, he argues that the concept of the rule of law can apply to state as well as 
non-state legal centers and processes, although its substance may vary with the 
context of the exercise of public authority to which it is applied. As such, rule of 
law applied to rebel governance would be substantially distinct from that applied to 
the state. He explores how international legal instruments in the field of 
international human rights law and international humanitarian law seem to 
underwrite this. Provost then defines four elements to a rebel rule of law: the 
administration of governance must be part of a broader system of governance; the 
application of rules must be stable and predictable; it must include some minimum 
elements of procedural fairness; and the administration of governance must be 
related to objectives of social justice. In defining the substance of rebel rule of law 
Provost does not aim to legitimize the cause of armed groups, but rather to have a 
yardstick by which to measure and criticize the practices of non-state armed groups 
and a tool with which to engage in dialogue with these groups to encourage them 
to alter their behavior. 
In the third article, Individual Choice of Law for Indigenous People in Canada: 
Reconciling Legal Pluralism with Human Rights?, Ghislain Otis focuses on the choice 
people in pluri-legal societies have between different normative systems and their 
dispute settlement institutions. He distinguishes between the choice of personal 
status—where individuals from a certain ethno-cultural or religious community 
fully abandon their legally recognized status as a member of that group—and choice 
of personal law—where an individual can opt out of some specific community 
norms under certain circumstances. The article focuses on the latter and first shows 
that historically, there was no formal system of coordination between state law and 
indigenous law, due to the state’s indifference and hostility towards indigenous law. 
This changed with the 1982 constitutional recognition of aboriginal and treaty rights 
of the indigenous people of Canada and subsequent self-government agreements 
and treaties between the government and indigenous nations. These new 
instruments all offer individuals, explicitly or more implicitly, a choice of law. The 
purpose of choice of law is to ensure that indigenous persons will not be denied 
access to rights, programs, and benefits made available by the state to all Canadian 
citizens. During the colonial era, European colonial powers saw choice of law as an 
instrument to encourage colonized people to submit to the law of the colonizer, as 
“a vector for a gradual transition from a plurality of legal systems native to the 
territory to legal and political unity within the state system.”30 Thus, choice of law 
was asymmetrical—people could move from indigenous law to the state law, but 
not the other way around—and was supposed to cause non-state law and 
 
29. René Provost, FARC Justice: Rebel Rule of Law, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 227 (2018). 
30. Ghislain Otis, Individual Choice of Law for Indigenous People in Canada: Reconciling Legal 
Pluralism with Human Rights?, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 207 (2018). 
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institutions to atrophy. According to Otis, this rationale for individual choice of law 
has lost much of its authority now that cultural and legal diversity are increasingly 
seen as worthy of protection. A new rationale for individual choice is found in the 
protection of human rights in indigenous societies. The human rights implications 
of choice of law have not, however, been rigorously examined. Otis examines how 
the choice of law is framed and what this means in practice in Canada. On the basis 
of that analysis, he concludes that the protection of human rights does not require 
choice of law in the case of Canada, because that protection is safeguarded in  
other ways, such as the fact that the treaties make indigenous governments and  
law-making authorities subject to the provisions of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms and that gender equality is provided for in the statute that gives 
recognition to aboriginal and treaty rights. As a result, legal remedies are already 
available to a person who feels his or her rights or freedoms have been infringed by 
indigenous authorities in the exercise of their powers under the treaty. Otis 
concludes that making indigenous law exclusive—not allowing individuals to opt 
out and choose state law—will strengthen the legal systems of the new indigenous 
authorities and further self-government of indigenous peoples. Individual choice of 
law is not necessary to safeguard human rights of indigenous individuals, although 
perhaps indigenous communities value access to state law for other reasons. 
In the fourth article, Global Legal Pluralism as a Normative Project, Paul Schiff 
Berman urges legal pluralists to defend core post-World War II values by going 
from a descriptive enterprise to a more normative one, prescribing law, policies and 
governmental institutional designs that foster interaction and dialogue among 
multiple norm-generating communities. Berman first describes the birth of global 
legal pluralism from the insight that in the current, highly globalized world, not only 
the state, but also international and non-state entities, have law-making capacities. 
An emphasis on pluralism in the international sphere is useful to analyze hybrid 
legal spaces created by a set of overlapping jurisdictions. Additionally, it makes 
redundant the debate whether international law is really law given its limited direct 
enforcement power, through its focus on whether people perceive commands to be 
binding on them, and how these commands influence local power struggles and 
legal consciousness. It also recognizes the state as consisting of multiple actors and 
voices, with different and conflicting interests, beliefs, and ideas. Each of these 
actors can have recourse to the morality and power of international, transnational, 
and non-state norms in the contest for the development and implementation of 
certain state actions and policies. As a normative project, legal pluralism can focus 
on substantive or procedural questions, but Berman focusses mainly on procedural 
mechanisms, institutions, and discourse to manage pluralism. He aims to find a 
different road, one that does not need to kill off all competing interpretations of 
law by prescribing what the law looks like, and what it does not look like. This road 
lies in the middle between “sovereignist territorialism”—which renders outsiders 
and their normative orderings irrelevant—and the “universalist approach”—which 
requires people to be conceptualized as fundamentally identical to be brought within 
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one universal normative system. Berman then describes six institutional principles 
for evaluating the ways in which legal systems interact, which translate into six 
mechanisms for managing legal pluralism. He admits that global legal pluralism as a 
normative project may lose sight of the radical critique on the presumed power of 
official legal systems and may instead fall back on “liberal legality” in pursuing 
practical solutions. While this will entail limitations on the range of hybridity, the 
language used, and the sorts of arguments entertained, he posits that the end 
justifies the means. The protection of post-World War II values of tolerance and 
interrelation are at stake, and the introduction of some legal pluralism into the 
framework is better than none at all. 
This volume concludes with Erin Stiles’ article, How to Manage a Marital 
Dispute: Legal Pluralism from the Ground Up in Zanzibar. Stiles draws on two years of 
fieldwork centered on marital disputes in Zanzibar, Tanzania. She builds on work 
that argues for the contribution of legal pluralism to studies of Islamic law and 
extends this beyond the confines of state-recognized institutions to other types of 
legal authority. She urges the study of legal pluralism from the ground up in order 
to assess how different legal actors—including lay people as well as institutional 
actors—perceive and approach the pluri-legal system and different forms of 
authority, and what they consider law and legally relevant in the handling of marital 
disputes. Stiles describes the role of three different authorities in the processing of 
marital disputes in Zanzibar, which are each associated with a different body of 
legally relevant knowledge and draw their authority and legitimacy from a different 
source. These include first the wazee, elders whose authority is sometimes seen as 
based on custom, sometimes as resulting from the religious requirement to respect 
the authority of elders, and sometimes simply as how things should be. Second, 
sheha are government-appointed community leaders, who are regarded as familiar 
with community norms, values, and standards. They do not have specific 
knowledge of religious law and try to help the parties to get to an agreement rather 
than impose a decision or solution themselves. They describe their own work not 
as specifically legal. The Islamic or kadhi courts form the third authority involved 
in marital disputes. These derive their authority from Islamic law but are also 
associated with the state, whose laws circumscribe their jurisdiction to family 
matters over Muslims, prohibiting them from applying Islamic law in its entirety. 
What is remarkable about the Zanzibari case study is that disputants do not engage 
in forum-shopping in the sense of choosing between the different normative 
registers and their institutional authorities. Instead, disputants engage the different 
authorities in a sequential procedure, from wazee to sheha to kadhi—all “regarded as 
tiered and compulsory steps in the widely agreed upon process of managing marital 
disputes.”31 Stiles posits that the flexible use of the term “sheria” in Zanzibar 
reflects the pluralism in the legal landscape. Although derived from the Arabic word 
 
31. Erin E. Stiles, How to Manage a Marital Dispute: Legal Pluralism from the Ground Up in 
Zanzibar, 8 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 275 (2018). 
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shari’a, in Zanzibar it is a more general word for law and does not necessarily mean 
religious or Islamic law. It is the suffixes—such as sheria za kiislam (Islamic law), 
sheria za kanuni (state law), and sheria za mila (customary law)—that determine the 
precise meaning of the word. The term sheria can thus be used to denote the rights 
and duties expected in marriage, whether resulting from Islamic legal ideas or from 
custom and community norms. Stiles describes several changes that have taken 
place in people’s legal consciousness, including the weakening of elder authority. 
This weakening is connected to the loss of legitimacy of corporal punishment, 
which in turn is attributed to increasing Islamic education, and forms part of a larger 
shift in legal consciousness from a more customary means of handling marital 
problems towards one more inspired by Islamic legal norms. Despite the perceived 
change in their authority, elders still play a significant role in handling marital 
disputes, not as final authority, but rather because the kadhi courts respect their 
decisions and see their “contracts” as binding on the parties. This shows that while 
legal pluralism continues to define the legal reality of Zanzibari citizens, its specific 
constellation constantly shifts in form. 
Taken together, these articles showcase the broad scope of the current field 
of legal pluralism studies. They range from discussion of legal pluralism at the  
sub-state level to the global level; transverse the normative registries emanating 
from states, international and transnational law, custom, religion, and other non-
state orderings that are more (prisoners law) or less (rebel governance) “private”; 
and see a role for descriptive as well as normative approaches to legal pluralism. As 
such, this issue of the UC Irvine Law Review clearly displays that the field of legal 
pluralism has expanded and matured. From a field of study relevant exclusively to 
post-colonial societies regarding the interaction between state and non-state mainly 
customary, legal orders, legal pluralism has become more widely relevant, built on 
the recognition that “virtually every society is legally plural,”32 whether that society 
is defined at the national, sub-national or supranational level. 
 
 
32. Merry, supra note 13. 
